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ADDRESS
BY
THE HONORABLE EDWARD H. LEVI
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE
THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS

12:30 P.M.

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1975
WASHINGTON HILTON HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

It is an enormous pleasure and honor for me to be present at

this occasion marking the 75th anniversary of the Association of Law
Schools, in so many ways an association of law professors.

I

remember, with the partial deception of nostalgia, characteristic
of so many areas of American life, when the Association was much
smaller than it now is; when the papers given, sQmetimes seminal,
were the basis for thoughtful and active discussion; when deans and
professors could take part undiverted by all the other activities
expected of a successful law school in flight.

No matter that

this picture is overdrawn; it has some truth.

I note you have

separated out for treatment elsewhere the job-getting aspects,
a most important function not to be disregarded, but always
diversionary.

I hope this works.

What has happened to this

Association in its growth in size and in concerns -- some properly
selfish, some managerial, some pro bono, some exploring
relationships to other disciplines, some dealing more exclusively
with the substance and.procedure of the law -- is a paradigm of
what has occurred generally to organized groups of academics and
to governmental functions.

We have to struggle now, as was the

fact years ago but on a different scale, to focus attention on what
is most important.
your concerns.

Your program is full; it reflects the breadth of

I wish for you that serendipity which brings the rare

seminal paper, the thoughtful and active discussion.

You are an

enormously important part of the legal profession in our country
an importance unmatched by law teachers elsewhere.

The importance

is that you greatly influence the future course of legal history_

Over time, you have, in fact you cannot avoid having, a considerable
r'

and telling effect upon the rules and institutions which guide
American life or respond to its needs.

At a time such as ours when the popular faith is uncertain, or
is changing, and is susceptible to rescission or reaffirmation,
the law teaching profession has much added to its strategic

~osition.

I do not mean to speak of you as the voice of the volkgeist.
in many ways the law teaching profession plays that role.

But

In this,

of course, law teachers are not alone, but they are among the opinion
makers.

I am not sure this aspect of influence is the most

thoughtful or even intended.

One aspect -- but only one

of your

influence is that students years from now -- and I think this can
be documented -- will take for granted the observations they heard
when at law school.

All of us are likely to take for granted

judgments and ideas we heard or once had long ago.

This probably

relates to some principle concerning the paucity or the economy of
ideas.

Having gotten one, we are likely to stay with it, thinking

of it, indeed, in volkgeist terms as a felt need.

I am not going to

join those who blame or credit the schools, including the law
schools, for what is found for praise or mainly blame in the society
at large or the profession in particular.
influenced than influencing.
taken to the hills.
position.

You may be in fact more

And some law teachers, of course, have

But you are, for all of that, in an enviable

t,o

If, as Max Weber taught, the lawyer has a special

facility in political society because of the opportunity to arrange
his time, this is much more true, although in different ways, of the

law teaching profession -- a process vastly helped not only because
you have been picked as able and articulate, but also because of the
ease of publication.

Up to now I have been speaking of that kind of

opinion making which is on the periphery of the emergence of legal
doctrine in some official form -- a periphery which is as much the
source of law as any we have.

Beyond that, there is, of course, the

interchange which goes on between official, semi-official and law
teaching positions

an interchange, which if it does not ruin

scholarship, ought to be encouraged.
The position of the law teacher in the penumbra of law making
is both enhanced and made more challenging by the companionship of
the press with all the modern forms of instant and impressive
communication, and again with that principle of economy which means
that a thing once said is likely to be repeated as a kind of truism.
Truisms come from all kinds of places

at one time from the

coffee houses of London or the salons of Paris.

Participation in

this part of the penumbra is not given to all law professors, but
it is given to some who use it, and no doubt life will be duller
without this exchange.

The exchange not only inVOlves truisms about

felt needs, but also includes the labeling of work which goes on to
find solutions.

The labeling in turn serves to evoke or reinforce

conceptions about governmental functions.

The -conceptions mayor

may not be correct, but what ultimately is frequently involved
it is in so many things we do -- is an assumption about the proper

as

role and ways of law in government.

I can illustrate the point

to some degree by two small fairly recent incidents with which I was
somehow involved.

The second of these incidents concerns some

of my friends among you.

The first, so far as I know, does not.

The first concerns the guidelines which a committee in· the
Department of Justice at my direction have been preparing to set
forth the

ju~isdiction

and procedures to be followed by the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, which, as you know, while having consider
able autonomy, is part of the Department of Justice.

The com

mittee, chaired by Mary Lawton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General

in the Office of Legal Counsel, is composed of representatives
of my office, the Criminal and the Civil Rights Divisions, the
Office of Policy and Planning, and the FBI.

The origin of the

present venture is a commitment which I made to the Senate
Judiciary Committee at my confirmation hearing.

I

then said

that, if confirmed, I would assume the responsibility for having
such guidelines prepared, presented and discussed with the
relevant congressional committees.

This assumption of

responsibility was taken because, as I said to the Committee,
I did not want merely to say to the Committee that such controls

were the Committee's problem which "indeed, in many ways it
is."
The guidelines are not finished.

Four of the guide

lines in tentative form have been furnished to the members of
the Church Committee.

They have been shown to Chairman Edwards

of the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights
of the House Judiciary Committee.

The most important guidelines

dealing with domestic security investigations have been made
public.

The guidelines are extremely controversial, as is to

be expected if they are to mean anything.
to many issues on which people disagree.
at~empt

They speak directly
For example, they

to set forth the standard of evidence required before

there can be a limited preliminary investigation, using the
term "likelihood of the commission of a Federal crime;"

before

there can be a full investigation, using the term "specific
and articulable facts giving reason t.o believe, I~ and when

there can be preventive action, strictly circumscribed, using
the term "probable cause."
Speaking of the guidelines last August before the
American Bar Association, I said "the guidelines obviously are
not in final form.
or executive orders.
tion."

Some might be most appropriate as statutes
Others could be put into effect by regula

I was somewhat surprised last December 7th to see

repeated in the New York Times, and also elsewhere, the idea,
as the Times 'said, that "the guidelines were apparently designed
to ward off restrictive legisl.ation."

When I testified before

the Church Committee on December 11, I said,

fl • • •

In any event

the problem of proper controls, supervision and accountability
goes beyond the Director of the Bureau and the Attorney
General . . . . I think that better controls and performance can
be achieved through statutory means, executive orders,
guidelines, and reporting to appropriate congressional committees."
I expressed the hope that "the Department's guidelines
committee's efforts at articulation will be of use to this
(Congressional) committee and others as it considers drafting
legislation."

Undaunted, the New York Times returned to the

theme which it had bought, saying:

"Unfortunately, the

guidelines unveiled by Attorney General Levi go far beyond
the limited purpose (of insuring Attorney General control
over the Bureau) to encompass an effort to define the Bureau's
jurisdiction and its mode of operation.

Such a definition is

urgently needed; but it is up to Congress, not the Justice
Department, to provide it

. .. " .

The consequence is that a task which began with a
pledge to a Congressional committee to have it performed so
that it could be the basis for statutes, executive orders and
regulations, is now cast into a competition between an executive
agency and the legislature.

I assume this fits the notion of

an adversary system, but in fact it belittles an enormously
difficult task which can be performed only through our
cooperation and with great skill and care.
The second incident, which concerns some of you,
involved a dispute between the Secretary of Commerce and a
House Subcommittee chaired by Representative John E. Moss,
which subpoened the list of American corporations reporting
to the Secretary of Commerce information concerning a "request
for boycott (meaning Arab boycott) compliance."

The

corporations' reports to the Secretary were made under a
statutory provision which provided in part, that "no depart
ment ... or official exercising any functions under this Act
~hall

publish or disclose information hereunder

which is deemed confidential ... unless the head of such
Department ... determines that the withholding thereof is
contraty to the national interest."

The Secretary of Commerce,

relying on an Attorney General's opinion that the confidential
material should not be turned over unless he made the

requisite finding, refused to comply with the subpoena.

As

you know, he later agreed to provide the material to the
subcommittee under some circumstances of possible safeguards.
The Attorney General's opinion was not a popular one,
nor did I believe it would be popular when I signed it.

By

Anthony Lewis and others it was labeled as showing a predilec
tion for executive secrecy, rather than one of principle,
scholarship and independence.

My frield Philip Kurland hinted

that this was a claim of executive privilege, and that in any
event an opinion of the Attorney General, even though he is
bound by statute to give the opinion to the head of an executive
department on request, is only "partisan advocacy."

It

obviously did not have the objectivity, I gather, (and of
course I regret) of professorial views.

Since

Mr. Bork and I had previously been criticized as acting too much like
professors and not partisan advocates in filing an amicus brief,
along with our defense brief in the voting election law case, this
perhaps was a welcome charge.
Some interesting things happened in the heated controversy
that followed the Secretary's initial refusal . . The subcommittee
chairman demanded that the Department of Justice attorneys who had
written or worked on the draft of the opinion should submit to
questioning by committee investigators -- an interesting proposal
with all kinds of recollections, for those who can recall beyond a
single decade.

Then a group of 36 eminent law professors signed a

letter with Professor Kurland laying down the proper standard for
statutory construction.

The rule was as follows:

"Congress can

surrender its constitutionally mandated duties in a statute only
by express language, not by implication or silence."

The letter

did state that it assumed that "once subpoenaed reports have been
received, that you will handle them in a responsible way consistent
with the Rules of the House of Representatives, your oath of office,
and with respect to the rights of the affected parties."

The letter

did not mention that the House of Representatives Rule (XI(e)(2))
which requires that all Members shall have access to all information
obtained by a committee.

Nor does it refer to the Gravel case

which effectively shields any member of Congress from external
sanctions for making any information public.

But it is the proposed

rule of statutory construction which I find, I must say, of interest.

It does not go as far as that advanced by your adjunct member of
Harvard University who would find that a congressional act banning
the disclosure of information to Congress would be unconstitutional.
The rule which is advanced is a pleasant one since it certainly
would simplify matters.

There are more than a hundred congressional

statutes which pledge confidentiality to information which citizens
are required to give.

I must confess that at the time of the opinion

to Secretary Morton and shortly thereafter, I knew of no statute
which completely banned the disclosure of confidential information
thus obtained to Congress although there were some statutes which
provided for disclosure to particular committees, and thus implied
non-disclosure to others.

Since then further research has dis

closed two additional statutes which in the pledge of confidential
refer, alorig with other bodies, to legislative proceedings.
vast majority of statutes -- practically all
explicit prohibition.

~-

The

state no such

This is true with respect to intimate details

involved in census data, drug treatment records, research on runaway
youths and many more.

Is it to be the conception of good government

that the Congress, which passes the law and states that the items are
to be kept confidential, is free itself to ignore that confidential
ity?

The problem has nothing to do with Executive Privilege or the

division of powers.

It has to do with the trust which should

exis~

and should be lived up to, between a government and its masters,
are the citizens.

With all due deference -- which I mean -- the

presumption or rule of statutory construction set forth by the

worthy band of your members is in fact an unenacted legislative
amendment to one hundred or more statutes, which in particular
cases Congress would never pass, and in its present form if
effective would work a deception, not on the Executive, but on the
citizens who provide the information.

My own view is that it would
each with

be appropriate to review each one of these statutes

its own special history, which we took into account in the Morton
case, and then propose an exp+icit amendment with each.
a major task.

It would be

Knowing of the research institutes and the interest

in legislation which law schools have, possibly this is a task which
you could help accomplish.
I have ventured to describe these two incidents because I know
something about them, because at least one of them involves some of
you, but more importantly because they are not at all unusual.

They

are part of the working out of governmental problems, with all the
misunderstandings, and a great deal left to be done.

Each of the

incidents involves in some way or another conflicting values
strongly held.

I think it is also fair to say that many of us share

within ourselves the conflicting values.

It is not enough to say,

I think -- and in fact I reject the view -- that the conflicting
values line up for us because of the adversary side we happen to be
on.

I do not regard the proper jurisdictional scope and base and

the procedures to be used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as
an adversary matter.

On the contrary, I think these are matters

and I assume you share this view -- of deep concern to the security

I

of our country and to the liberty of our citizens.

I do not myself

like boycotts from whatever quarter they may come.

The problem of

confidentiality of information secured from citizens is surely a
matter in which you have some interest.

I did not feel in the least

instructed -- in fact I had no instructions -- as to the Adminis
tration position with respect to the individual company information
supplied to Secretary Morton.
tration position.

I don't know if there was an Adminis

Statutes of this kind, it seems to me, have to be

interpreted primarily on the basis of the justified reliance upon
them, and this, in the absence of the new doctrine announced by the
thirty-seven professors, involves an analysis of the words used,
the history of interpretation, and such legislative history as there
is.

Nor do I think that correctness of interpretation is always to.

be expected.

What I think

to be more significant is the alacrity with which the working out
~of

such problems is immediately cast into the model of a dispute

between the Executive and the Congress.
with it dramatized that issue.

Watergate and what went

We are in a post Watergate era.

We are doing the usual thing of reliving the past where the lines
of argument are set forth and they are easy to pick up.

But the

lessons of history are much more complicated than this assumes,
and surely it is to the academic world one would hope to turn for the
second and third thoughts on what we have learned, the corrective
steps to be taken, and the problems which face us today.
we are a country prone to cycles.

We know

Each branch of the government at

times has abused its power, and all, unless memories are very
short -- which I am afraid they are -- have done so in recent times.
But the academic memory should be longer.

For one thing you

have time to think, a most precious asset which our country needs.
I do not deny, indeed I would emphasize, that, as so many of
you have reason to know, things look different dependent upon the
particular responsibilities or worries you have.
- about the rule of law is that we are all in it
judgments and acts are catching.

The nice thing

togeth~r;

decisions,

If confidential material from

one part has to be turned over, I sURgest it has to be turned
over from another part, as well.
~flow

from one field into another.

Decisions, judgments and acts
I do not think the adversary

model when removed from its protective courtroom setting is a
help when it is used to attack these larger issues.
think this is one of the lessons of Watergate itself.

Indeed I should'
Because

things do look different depending on where one stands, it is
particularly important that there be an interchange and a sharing
of knowledge and views among us.

An enonnous barrier in the way of

such an exchange, of course, occurs in areas of secrecy.

This is one

reason the Department of Justice has endeavored to use, and has been
greatly aided by the use, of consultants among you.

It is the reason

we have tried tp make public in as candid a fashion as possible the
kinds of problems and issues we believe must be faced.
are such an example.

The guidelines

The controversy about them is a good thing.

We knew the issue of preventive action would raise something of a storm.
The guidelines as written permit preventive action using non-violent and
lawful measures only when there is probable cause to believe force and
violence in violation of Federal law with real and immediate threat to
life or the essential functioning of government is present, and where
the action is necessary tQ minimize the danger because other
alternatives are not available.

The specific authorization of the

Attorney General is required, as is a subsequent report to the Congress.
We have been asked in the discussions of this guideline why mass arrests
might not be better.

I suggest that makes a very interesting

question, which ought to be pursued.
who favor mass arrests.

I have not heard of many people

We could have the guidelines silent on the

point entirely, or we could have legislation prohibiting any preventive
action. Whatever the result, the questions are real, and they should
be looked at.
In so many areas where the law attempts to control or influence
behavior, we not only have unanswered questions, but we avoid asking
the questions.

In the past the failure 'to ask the

questions and to confront them led eventually to judicial
ntervention

where iegislative enactment would have been more

appropriate.

In the past general statutes, without the help of

prior guidelines setting forth the problems, as only an attempt to
show what the solutions might look like and do, has led to
subsequent executive orders and departmental rules at a considerable
distance, and sometimes in contradiction to the statutes which
were passed.
The past is full of grave abuses and they have been
uncovered.

I do not wish to belittle these abuses of the past

when I call to mind that they are not so limited in time as to be only
contemporary.

When I was recently asked whether J. Edgar Hoover,

if he were alive, might be indictable, the thought passed through

my mind, and was of course immediately suppressed, that Thomas
Jefferson might have been subject to impeachment because of the
Louisiana Purchase.

This is not said to condone but to suggest

that the writing of history by picking and choosing is likely
to be an unfair and inaccurate business.

We do have much to

rectify but we must also live in this day and for tomorrow.

The

quality of that living calls for an awareness of the problems as
they now are, a deeper inquiry into the meaning and implications
of the values we hold dear, and the special skills for working out
roblems

which we are willing honestly to confront.

Sometimes in this talk I have spoken of professors and of
you.

I do not think -- at least I hope I have not -- lost my

union card.

There is much work for all of us to do.

The services

of the most scholarly branch of the legal profession are
needed now as never before.

